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Abstract
Local-level leaders in contemporary Indonesia have involved in the country’s 
turbulent politics. The regent of  Purwakarta (2008-2018), Dedi Mulyadi, 
employed, for the most part, culture-based political preferences develop 
his territory. In doing so, he frequently encountered with various forms of  
Islamization of  politics, hindering his strategies to reach his individual goals, 
to display his socio-political identity, and to socio-culturally empower cultural 
resilience. The regent appeared to challenge rampant Islamization of  politics 
by “waging the war” against Islamist groups in the name of  Sundanese 
indigenous culture. This paper seeks to explore recent developments of  the 
relationships between Islam and local culture in Indonesia with the case study 
of  Purwakarta in particular and West Java in general, and how a local-level 
leader was able to optimize his potentials to empower cultural resilience in the 
midst of  Islamization of  politics. This paper also investigates the complex 
landscape of  these relationships in an effort to map out the various forces at 
play and shows that by investigating the interplay between religion, culture, 
and other entities, a key driver local level played pivotal roles in his ways of  
defining ethnic identity, creating authority, and empowering cultural resilience. 
[Terdapat beberapa pemimpin daerah terlibat dalam dinamika politik 
nasional dewasa ini. Dedi Mulyadi, Bupati Purwakarta periode 2008-2018, 
termasuk salah satunya yang membangun daerah dengan berbasis pada 
budaya lokal. Bersamaan dengan itu, ia sering berhadapan dengan sejumlah 
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gerakan Islam politik yang menghambat tujuannya dalam mempertahankan 
identitas sosio-politik dan memberdayakan ketahanan budaya lokal. Sang 
bupati tampil dengan identitas budaya lokal Sunda dalam rangka menghadapi 
tantangan Islamisasi politik dari kelompok-kelompok Islamis yang 
‘mengobarkan perang’ kemana mana. Tulisan ini membahas perkembangan 
terkini hubungan antara Islam dan budaya lokal di Indonesia, dengan studi 
kasus di Purwakarta pada khususnya, dan Jawa Barat pada umumnya, serta 
bagaimana pemimpin daerah mampu memaksimalkan kemampuannya dalam 
mempertahankan budaya lokal di tengah arus Islamisasi politik. Tulisan 
ini juga menginvestigasi kompleksitas konteks hubungan-hubungan tersebut 
dalam usaha memetakan kekuatan yang bermain dan menunjukkan bahwa 
dengan menginvestigasi kaitan yang tumpang tindih antara agama, budaya, 
dan entitas-entitas lainnya, seorang penggerak di tingkat lokal memainkan 
peran penting dalam mendefinisikan identitas etnis, penciptaan otoritas, serta 
memberdayakan ketahanan budaya lokal.]
Keywords: Identity politics; cultural resilience; Islamization of  politics; 
Dedi Mulyadi; Purwakarta; Sundanese
A. Introduction
This paper aims to explore recent developments of  the relationships 
between Islam and local culture in Indonesia, in the case of  Purwakarta 
in particular and West Java in general, and how a local-level leader has 
been able to optimize his potentials to empower cultural resilience in 
the midst of  Islamization of  politics. It shows that the ongoing state-
building processes, including decentralization and democratization, 
have allowed for the emergence of  new seemingly-autonomous local 
leaders, such as Dedi Mulyadi, the regent of  Purwakarta for the periods 
of  2008-2013 and 2013-2018. This paper seeks to answer the following 
questions: What roles have democratization and decentralization played 
in initiating local empowerment and maintaining patronage? What factors 
have shaped and characterized waves of  Islamization of  politics? What 
factors have guided the interaction between Islam and local culture? How 
have notions of  Islamic symbols and cultural pride been used in order 
to convey messages in the encounters between Islam and local culture? 
To what extent have the strategies employed by Dedi Mulyadi affected 
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his individual goals, his identity, his representation of  the people, and 
the socio-cultural empowerment he has promoted? 
Since the collapse of  the New Order in 1998, Indonesia has 
experienced rapid and fundamental developments of  everyday 
relationships between Islam and politics. There has been an Islamization 
of  politics expressed in, among other things, the adoption of  local 
Islamic laws in the context of  democratization; the rise of  political Islam 
or Islamism, that is Islam as political ideology rather than religion or 
theology; and the growth of  modern political Islamic fundamentalism 
that claims to (re)-create a true Islamic society.1 
The Islamization of  politics in Indonesia appears to have presented 
an enigma. On the one hand, despite the fluctuative results, the overall 
electoral support for Islamist parties has been in steady decline since 1998 
when the country became a democracy.2 On the other hand, there has 
been an Islamization of  politics as expressed in hundreds of  sharia (or 
at least sharia-inspired) laws (Islamic laws) that have been adopted across 
the country since 1998. Moreover, on the one hand, the developments 
of  Islam in law and politics seem to indicate that Indonesian Islam has 
become more rigidly conservative or radical. On the other hand, the 
driving of  rapid Islamic commodification and the growth of  urban 
middle-class Muslims have shaped a more resilient religious culture and 
thinking.3 
After the 1998 political reformation, Indonesia has gone through 
unremitting socio-political transformations that have shaped and 
characterized local political culture in the context of  decentralization 
and democratization. This post-New Order period has witnessed an 
increasing tendency in which people are able to voice their socio-political 
concerns. This is in stark contrast to the circumstances in the previous 
authoritarian period when the state incessantly attempted to break into 
and arrange all aspects of  its citizens’ lives. The power of  the state rested 
upon its dominant control over the public and private realms. In a Muslim 
1 Yanwar Pribadi, Islam, State and Society in Indonesia: Local Politics in Madura 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2018), p. 7. 
2 Greg Fealy, “Indonesia’s Islamic parties in decline”, Inside Story (11 May 2009), 
https://insidestory.org.au/indonesias-islamic-parties-in-decline/, accessed 27 Sep 2018.
3 Pribadi, Islam, State and Society in Indonesia, p. 8.
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society in which local traditions and customs are frequently identified with 
Islam, the roles of  religious leaders to perceive, censor, and disseminate 
political perceptions are highly evident. During the New Order, when 
access to information was limited, ulama were the central sources of  
information, including political affairs, for commoners. Nowadays, the 
more democratic socio-political circumstances in the post-New Order 
have given more opportunities for other segments of  society to do so.
Based on library research, particularly by looking at periodicals 
in the Internet, I employ historical and political science approaches in 
making analyses in this paper. This is a paper with a historical-political 
science perspective. While observing Dedi Mulyadi; his disputes with 
Islamist groups and other people; and the encounter between Islam and 
local culture in a chronological order, I also investigate democratization 
and decentralization processes in local politics; Islamization of  politics; 
and local-level leaders’ efforts to maintain their power and influence 
through political science perspective. With Purwakarta and West Java 
as the settings, it might be argued that despite the narrow geographical 
focus, this paper offers a broader insight of  the entanglement between 
Islam, politics, and local cultures in other places in Indonesia. 
The role of  the Nahdlatul Ulama (the NU) and the Muhammadiyah 
as the two largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia was very crucial 
during the politics of  aliran (literally stream) in 1950s. It was these mass 
organizations (ormas) which served to root political parties in society, 
channelling voter support to them. It is not easy, however, to trace how 
increased personal piety in post-New Order Indonesia has translated in 
the political arena. It seems that while Islam is frequently a political issue 
at both the national and regional levels, Islamic political parties have 
been unable to capitalize on these sentiments.4 In a similar vein, ethnic-
based sentiments have not been able to take advantage either. It began 
when national political leaders were reluctant to accommodate the idea 
of  the establishment of  ethnic-based political parties during the political 
upheavals of  the early years of  the Republic of  Indonesia.5
4 Jacqueline Hicks, “The Missing Link: Explaining the Political Mobilisation 
of  Islam in Indonesia”, Journal of  Contemporary Asia, vol. 42, no. 1 (2012), pp. 40–5.
5 Ben Hillman, “Ethnic Politics and Local Political Parties in Indonesia”, Asian 
Ethnicity, vol. 13, no. 4 (2012), p. 420.
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The aversion of  the government to accommodate both religious 
and ethnic-based sentiments have not been without strong reasons. 
A comparison of  election results (Pemilu) from 1955, 1999 and 2004 
indicates that decades of  authoritarian rule and ideological manipulation 
by Indonesia’s first two presidents, Sukarno and Suharto, did little to 
change the nation’s political culture and that the overlapping primordial 
loyalties of  religion and ethnicity continue to dominate its politics. This 
in turn suggests that Indonesia remains vulnerable to ethnic and religious 
conflicts. The fact that political parties reflect primordial loyalties of  
ethnicity and religion rather than policy positions has the potential to 
hinder the consolidation of  Indonesia’s newly emerging democracy.6 If  
we look at the situation at the regional level, in West Java, for instance, 
we may notice that when in 1952 the traditionalist NU broke away from 
the reformist Masyumi because of  a conflict over the distribution of  
government positions, not all who remained in Masyumi were reformists. 
In fact, many traditionalists in West Java remained faithful to Masyumi 
and distanced themselves from (Javanese-dominated) NU.7 These 
Masyumi followers in West Java have been the main supporters of  the 
implementation of  sharia or sharia-inspired local laws. As recorded by the 
Asia Foundation, between 2000 and 2009, 74 regencies and municipalities 
(kabupaten and kota) implemented sharia-based local laws. In 42 of  the 
74 districts, major nationalist parties gained more than 50 per cent of  
the vote. In 72 of  the 74 districts, the nationalist parties together with 
two Islamic parties, PAN and PKB, gained more than 50 per cent of  
the vote. It is striking that despite their majority in local parliaments, the 
nationalist parties could not prevent, and even seemed to support, the 
passing of  sharia by-laws. Of  the 74 districts, 32 were in the traditional 
Golkar strongholds of  West Java, West Sumatra and South Sulawesi.8
 I would thus argue in this paper that local politics in many places 
6 Mark Woodward, “Indonesia’s Religious Political Parties: Democratic 
Consolidation and Security in Post-New Order Indonesia”, Asian Security, vol. 4, no. 
1 (2008), p. 42.
7 Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of  Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia”, South East Asia Research, vol. 10, no. 2 (2002), pp. 120–1.
8 Sunny Tanuwidjaja, “Political Islam and Islamic Parties in Indonesia: Critically 
Assessing the Evidence of  Islam’s Political Decline”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 
32, no. 1 (2010), p. 41.
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in Indonesia, including West Java, in the post-New Order is marked by 
recurrent processes in which Islam and local cultural elements coexist, 
flourish, interlace, and strive in complex, pragmatic, and mutually 
beneficial relationships. Many actors of  local politics in West Java, groups 
of  local leaders, have been engaged in the formation and transformation 
of  political culture since the Sukarno era, particularly since the New 
Order. The actors are part of  larger configurations of  interdependent 
individuals within Sundanese society and Indonesian society at large. 
The socio-political formations of  local politics in West Java have been 
exercised by local leaders, who each play their part. These local leaders 
have frequently employed and promoted Islamic symbols and cultural 
elements to reinforce their positions in society, and nowadays have 
also attempted to empower their citizens in accordance with the spirit 
of  democratization and decentralization. In this paper we shall look at 
whether these circumstances hold true for the Purwakarta and West Java 
case.
B. Democratization and Decentralization: a Reason to Initiate 
Local Empowerment and a Pretext for Maintaining Patronage
After the Suharto administration collapsed, the relationships 
between the central government and religious leaders changed. For 
instance, alongside the rise of  more independent religious leaders, the 
sole authority of  the state, as well as its coercive force, began to disappear. 
Therefore, most religious leaders have had more freedom not to rely 
on the power and capital of  the state. While the Suharto administration 
had positioned itself  as an administration attempting to reform the 
previous rule (the Old Order) and to guide the state towards a ‘rightful 
and democratic course’, the post-Suharto era has set out more democratic 
and decentralized policies, allowing people’s leaders in many regions to 
spread their influence.
Despite its short reign (May 1998-October 1999), the B.J. Habibie 
presidency was marked by significantly decentralized policies that 
included establishing two important laws, the Law No. 22/1999 that 
dealt with the devolution of  political authority and No. 25/1999 that 
set out a new system of  fiscal arrangements that favoured the regions 
through DPR (the national parliament), which set in motion a process of  
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administrative decentralization that came into effect on 1 January 2001.9 
An era of  decentralization replaced the old centralized period that seemed 
to have neglected regional autonomy. In the opinion of  international 
development agencies and NGOs, decentralization is thought to support 
good governance, especially at the local levels.10 
I would suggest that local politics in Indonesia has long been a 
field in which local leaders obtain power. The ongoing state-building 
processes in the post-Suharto period has allowed for the emergence of  
new seemingly-autonomous local leaders. In decentralized Indonesia, 
key political dynamics occur at the local level.11 There has come up an 
expectation in which as the state relinquishes its control, there arise social 
and political opportunities for civil society to organize and demand more 
transparent and accountable governance practices.12
Under the new circumstances due to the two new laws, the central 
government was required to cede authority to regional governments in 
all fields except foreign policy, defence and security, monetary policy, the 
legal system and religious affairs. The role of  the provinces was confined 
to areas such as mediating disputes between districts, facilitating cross-
district development and representing the central government within the 
region.13 Regency heads during the New Order were formally elected by 
9 Van Klinken and Henk Schulte Nordholt, “Introduction”, in Renegotiating 
Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia, ed. by Gerry Van Klinken and Henk 
Schulte Nordholt (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2007), p. 12; Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, 
“Introduction: Decentralisation, Democratisation and the Rise of  the Local”, in Local 
Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation & Democratisation, ed. by Edward Aspinall 
and Greg Fealy (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), p. 3.
10 Henk Schulte Nordholt, “Decentralisation in Indonesia: Less State, More 
Democracy?”, in Politicising Democracy: The New Local Politics of  Democratisation, ed. by 
John Harriss, Kristian Stokke, and Olle Törnquist (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004).
11 Vedi R. Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia 
Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).
12 Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (eds.), Deepening Democracy: Institutional 
Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (London and New York: Verso, 2003).
13 Aspinall and Fealy, “Introduction: Decentralisation, Democratisation and 
the Rise of  the Local”, pp. 3–4; Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia’s Direct Elections: 
Empowering the Electorate or Entrenching the New Order Oligarchy?”, in Soeharto’s 
New Order and Its Legacy, ed. by Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (Canberra: ANU Press, 
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the regency parliaments, while the decision was in reality made (‘direstui’ 
in common Indonesian rhetoric) by the central government. It was 
not uncommon for the regent to have a military background, or be a 
Dandim (military commander at the regency level), and not be a putra 
daerah (literally ‘sons of  the region’). When the Suharto administration 
collapsed and as ideas about decentralization emerged as a result of  
discontent about centralization policies, the Law No. 22/1999 on 
decentralization was established. This new law provided local parliaments 
with significant power to control the elections of  the regent. This 
decentralization signified the start of  putra daerah occupying strategic 
bureaucratic positions.14 
The nature and role of  regional elites in post-New Order, 
particularly in the fields of  bureaucracy, economy, and identity politics 
have often been characterized as predatory figures nurtured under 
the New Order. Nankyung Choi suggests that despite the presence 
and persistence of  old elite from the old regime, a process of  elite 
diversification has taken hold at the grassroots level, as new type of  local 
power seekers has emerged from diverse backgrounds. This new type of  
local power seekers pursues elected position by collecting support from 
their constituencies such as local communities, business constituencies, 
and a variety of  civil society organizations.15        
Democratization and decentralization are two processes 
continuously taking place and evolving in Indonesia. They have emerged 
as a result of  discontent about centralization policies and as a result 
of  the continual reformation process in the post-Suharto period. The 
two elements have perhaps been most relevant in the context of  local 
politics.16 However, the decentralization process in Indonesia is not 
synonymous with the process of  democratization. Schulte Nordholt and 
Van Klinken argue that decentralization does not necessarily result in 
democratization, good governance and the strengthening of  civil society 
2010), p. 176.
14 Pribadi, Islam, State and Society in Indonesia, p. 156.
15 Nankyung Choi, “Local Political Elites in Indonesia: ‘Risers’ and ‘Holdovers’”, 
Sojourn: Journal of  Social Issues in Southeast Asia, vol. 29, no. 2 (2014), pp. 366–7.
16 Aspinall and Fealy, “Introduction: Decentralisation, Democratisation and 
the Rise of  the Local”, p. 2.
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at the regional level. Instead, the authors argue that what is prevalent is 
the decentralization of  corruption, collusion, and political violence that 
once belonged to the centralized administration of  the New Order, and is 
now transferred to the existing patrimonial patterns at the regional level.17 
After the downfall of  the New Order administration, Golkar 
began to lose its power and many of  its regional functionaries, cadres, 
and influential supporters had to prepare themselves for the changing 
political circumstances. All the regulations that had allowed them to 
occupy strategic positions in the regional administration were replaced by 
more democratic ones. Government employees were no longer required 
to endorse Golkar. New political parties were established, and at the 
provincial and regency levels, regional head positions eventually became 
available to more candidates. It became essential for Golkar men and 
other old political actors as well as newcomers to present themselves as 
‘putra daerah’ who represented regional interests rather than the interests 
of  the centre (Jakarta).18 I would suggest that this common condition in 
post-New Order favoured Dedi Mulyadi when he frequently represented 
himself  as a real ‘putra daerah’ of  Golkar. Moreover, according to Schulte 
Nordholt and Van Klinken, the salience of  ethnic and religious identities 
is the most striking feature of  provincial Indonesia after the downfall of  
the New Order. Ethnicity has become an ideology in a political struggle 
and, at the same time, it has also evoked a real depth of  feeling.19 As we 
can see, Dedi Mulyadi was known to frequently use and promote ethnic 
and religious identities during his tenure and when he competed for a 
vice governor post in West Java’s 2018 gubernatorial elections.20
17 Klinken and Schulte Nordholt, “Introduction”, p. 18.
18 Yanwar Pribadi, “Islam and Politics in Madura: Ulama and Other Local 
Leaders in Search of  Influence (1990-2010)”, Ph.D. Dissertation (Leiden: Leiden 
University, 2013), pp. 206–7.
19 Klinken and Schulte Nordholt, “Introduction”, p. 21.
20 See for instance: Nanang Sutisna, “Bupati Purwakarta Larang Wakuncar 
di Atas Pukul 21.00”, Tempo.co, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/696810/bupati-
purwakarta-larang-wakuncar-di-atas-pukul-21-00, accessed 28 Sep 2018; Irwan Nugraha, 
“Dedi Mulyadi Akan Terapkan Pelajaran Kitab Kuning Bagi Pelajar di Jabar”, Kompas.
com (4 Apr 2018), https://regional.kompas.com/read/2018/04/04/22294911/dedi-
mulyadi-akan-terapkan-pelajaran-kitab-kuning-bagi-pelajar-di-jabar, accessed 28 Sep 
2018.
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Since 1998 Indonesia has experienced a dramatic shift in political 
constellations. In the time since this transfer of  power, the Indonesian 
nation has sought to formulate and implement wide-ranging reforms 
that aim to democratize and improve governance systems. One way of  
doing so has been the decentralization of  the functions of  the Indonesian 
government. Ironically, while the reformation process is still taking place, 
one ‘pathological feature’ of  the previous administration, patronage, 
appears to have become a characteristic of  the post-New Order era. 
Indeed, patronage has even become a more widespread feature of  the 
political system along with the persistent general assumption that official 
positions will be used for purposes of  personal or in-group benefits.21 
This patronage pattern is not static because it has been affected 
by state-building processes and, by the same token, it has influenced 
these processes. At some point, patronage is inherited from the New 
Order, while its roots can be traced back to pre-colonial times. What 
we see here, then, is a ‘changing continuity’ that will help to explain 
the problems connected to decentralization and the establishment of  
regional autonomy.22 It is not an easy task, however, to explain how 
and why democratization and decentralization processes influence and 
characterize Dedi Mulyadi’s manoeuvres, particularly in relation with 
issues such as initiating local empowerment or maintaining patronage in 
the context of  local politics. Dedi Mulyadi’s encounters with Islamization 
of  politics may prove that both issues are of  importance, among other 
things, for his political goals in maintaining his populist approaches in 
order to further his political career more broadly. 
C. Waves of  Islamization of  Politics
Indonesia has been generally regarded as home to a moderate 
type of  Islam, at least compared to the more militant and fundamental 
waves of  Islamism that have commonly taken place in the Middle East. 
Nevertheless, it seems that in the last decades, there has been a significant 
21 Jamie Mackie, “Patrimonialism: The New Order and Beyond”, in Soeharto’s 
New Order and Its Legacy, ed. by Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (Canberra: ANU Press, 
2010), pp. 82–3.
22 Nordholt, “Decentralisation in Indonesia: Less State, More Democracy?”, 
pp. 30–1.
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transformation in religious observation of  Islam, as more Indonesian 
Muslims have become more aware and conscious about their perceptions 
and practices of  their religion. 
This circumstance is certainly not novel and unique to Indonesia as 
Muslims everywhere, both in Muslim-majority countries and elsewhere, 
have been gradually more aware of  their global presence that individuals 
and groups in North America, Australia, Europe, and elsewhere have a 
heightened awareness of  establishing part of  a world community and use 
this consciousness to amplify their voice and political strength. This is 
what is called “Muslim politics”, a concept that involves the competition 
over both the interpretation of  symbols and control of  the institutions, 
formal and informal, that produce and sustain them. The interpretation 
of  symbols is played out against the background of  an underlying 
framework that, while subject to contextualized nuances, is common to 
Muslims throughout the world.23
Indonesia is an example of  a state characterized by a plural 
and contested Muslim politics. In the last years of  the New Order, a 
powerful movement for a democratic Muslim politics took shape. Muslim 
participants in overthrowing the Suharto presidency were highlighted by, 
among other things, devising religious arguments in support of  pluralism, 
democracy, women’s rights and civil society. However, not so long after 
the downfall of  the authoritarian regime, Indonesia was disturbed by 
outbreaks of  fierce ethno-religious violence. The violence slowed the 
reform movement and put the Muslim community’s pluralist experiment 
in question. Nevertheless, these hindrances have proved that Muslim 
politics is not monolithic, and that there is more to its contemporary 
ferment than the bleak alternatives of  secularist authoritarianism or 
extremist violence.24 
Muslim participations in politics in Indonesia have long been 
encouraged by ulama’s teachings and practices. In the Indonesian 
archipelago during the nineteenth century when the implementation 
23 Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), p. 5.
24 Robert W. Hefner, “Introduction: Modernity and the Remaking of  Muslim 
Politics”, in Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization, ed. by Robert 
W. Hefner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 4.
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of  colonial power became effective, the emergence of  religious leaders 
primarily appeared in the periphery and frequently acted against the local 
and Dutch authorities.25 During the Sukarno administration, the role of  
Muslim leaders in Indonesian politics, as shown by Islamic organizations, 
indicates a series of  struggles in formulating the Islamic system of  state. 
For example, the NU managed to align itself  with the deep-rooted 
traditions of  the Indonesian people, especially in Java. Masyumi, on the 
other hand, blended its reform Islam with modernistic, more Western-
oriented but also nationalistic and secular current ideas. The development 
of  several Islamic parties was the result of  Muslim factions failing to 
realize the unitary political agreement of  a single party. 
In recent times, decentralization allows for the emergence of  a 
politically autonomous brand of  ulama. The way they survive and continue 
to exercise their influence in society is not surprising. There are two rather 
different reasons for that. Firstly, it shows that they are highly capable 
of  adjusting to the continuously changing political atmosphere of  the 
Indonesian state. Secondly, they continue to be needed by society to 
safeguard and preserve its values and norms.26  
Islam continues to serve as a crucial mobilizing ideology and 
social movement frame. However, Islam is not only a subject of  political 
contention, but also its object. For instance, in the Middle East, while 
religious militants continue to deploy Islam as an ideological frame to push 
for exclusive moral and socio-political order, secular Muslims, human 
rights activists, and, especially, middle-class women have campaigned 
against a reading of  Islam that underwrites patriarchy and justifies their 
subjugation.27 I would maintain that in Indonesia, Islamization of  politics 
has been outlined in the forms and aspects of  the relationships between 
state and society; between conflicts and accommodations; and between 
piety and tradition. In fact, what we see is actually a circumstance in 
which Islamic powers in secular countries have presented a challenge 
for states around the world, including Indonesia, home to the largest 
25 Martin van Bruinessen, “Global and Local in Indonesian Islam”, Southeast 
Asian Studies, vol. 37, no. 2 (1999), p. 164.
26 Pribadi, Islam, State and Society in Indonesia, p. 212.
27 Asef  Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), pp. 7–8.
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Muslim population as well as the third largest democracy in the world. As 
I have argued elsewhere, Islamization of  politics through the elements of  
state-society relations, authoritarianism, and regionalism, appears highly 
significantly in the development and dynamics of  Indonesia’s fledgling 
democracy,28 just as the case we see in Purwakarta and West Java below. 
D. The Encounters between Islam and Local Culture: a Case 
from Purwakarta29
The regent of  Purwakarta for the periods of  2008-2013 and 2013-
2018, Dedi Mulyadi, is an obvious product of  post-authoritarian Era 
Reformasi (the Reformation era/the post-New Order period). He began 
his political career as a member of  local parliament (DPRD) in the period 
of  1999-2004. However, in 2003 he was elected as vice regent (wakil 
bupati) of  Purwakarta together with Lily Hambali Hasan as the regent 
for the period of  2003-2008. In 2008 he won the first direct pilkada 
(pemilihan kepala daerah - elections in a province or regency/municipality 
to elect a governor or a regent/mayor) of  the Purwakarta regency. His 
vice regent was Dudung B. Supardi. In the next period, he enjoyed a 
comfortable victory for the second time in the pilkada. This time Dadan 
Koswara acted as his deputy. Apparently, Dedi Mulyadi was known as 
an eccentric figure during his reign. He wanted to make Purwakarta as 
a place of  cultural icon, and in order to realize his dream, he employed 
various unique cultural approaches and symbols of  pre- or non-Islamic 
features, such as erecting statues of  puppetry in many corners of  the 
town and encasing trees in the town with patterned fabrics of  black-and-
white, similar to those in Bali. He was even further believed to claim that 
he married Nyi Roro Kidul30 and provided a carriage for the Queen in 
a cultural festival in Purwakarta. 
28 Pribadi, Islam, State and Society in Indonesia, p. 2.
29 Some materials in this section are taken from Yanwar Pribadi, “Budaya 
Lokal versus Islam: Perseteruan antara Bupati Purwakarta dan FPI dalam Kerangka 
Demokratisasi dan Desentralisasi”, Harmoni, vol. 15, no. 3 (2016), pp. 75–86.
30 A legendary Indonesian female deity, known as the Queen of  the Southern 
Sea of  Java (Indian Ocean) in Javanese and Sundanese mythology.
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On 13 November 2015, Habib Rizieq31, along with a number 
of  FPI (Front Pembela Islam/Islamic Defenders Front) leaders and 
followers, delivered a sermon in Purwakarta on the request of  Kiai 
(ulama/religious leaders) Muhammad Syahid Joban, the leader of  Majlis 
Dakwah Manhajus Sholihin (MS) and Pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) 
Ibnu Sina in a khaul (annual celebrations held on the anniversaries of  
the death of  religious leaders) to commemorate Kiai Abdullah bin Awod 
Joban, the father of  Kiai Muhammad Syahid Joban. The sermon turned 
to a polemic and became a dispute after it was filmed and uploaded to 
a global video-sharing website, You Tube by Asep Muhammad Nazar, 
a member of  MS. In the video, Habib Rizieq mocked Dedi Muyadi’s 
predilection of  Sundanese culture instead of  Islamic values, particularly 
of  Dedi Mulyadi’s inclination to use a traditional Sundanese greeting, 
sampurasun (please pardon me) instead of  assalamualaikum (a Muslim 
greeting in Arabic that means peace be upon you). Habib Rizieq altered 
sampurasun to ‘campur racun’ (mixed poison). 
Subsequently, the West Java Siliwangi Youth Wing (AMS/Angkatan 
Muda Siliwangi), a mass organization devoted to the preservation of  
Sundanese culture, became angry. According to Denda Alamsyah, the 
Secretary General of  AMS, a member of  AMS Purwakarta accidentally 
attended the sermon and listened to Habib Rizieq’s scornful words. One 
day after the preaching, the video was uploaded to YouTube and became 
viral. The AMS Purwakarta reported the alleged insult to the central 
board (DPP) of  AMS in Bandung. Having learned about the video, 
the DPP AMS decided to report the insult to the police and demanded 
that Habib Rizieq be charged in accordance with the applicable laws. 
The DPP AMS claimed that Habib Rizieq had disdained the Sundanese 
because sampurasun as a traditional Sundanese greeting has great values 
and becomes a symbol of  pride of  the ethnic community. Habib Rizieq 
31 Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, known as Habib Rizieq is the founder of  the FPI. 
Both of  his parents were Arab Indonesians of  Hadhrami descents. Prior to his roles 
at FPI, Habib Rizieq was a school teacher, a member of  Jamiat Kheir (one of  a few 
early private institutions in Indonesia that is engaged in education, and is instrumental 
in the history of  Indonesian struggle against Dutch colonialism), and a chairman of  a 
number of  majelis taklim (religious congregations). He was the head of  the FPI from 
1998 to 2003, and since 2003 he has become the Chairman of  the board of  Tanfidz 
(executive board). He has been elected as the Great Imam of  FPI for life since 2013. 
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was reported by the DPP AMS to Polda Jawa Barat (West Java’s provincial 
police command) on 24 November 2015. Following the report, the 
DPP AMS had a meeting with a number of  Sundanese-community 
organizations (Aliansi Masyarakat Sunda Menggugat/AMSM), and they 
agreed that Habib Rizieq had to be charged in accordance with the 
applicable laws and that he had to confess his mistakes and apologize 
for his insulting words.32
Besides sampurasun, Habib Rizieq also attacked Dedi Mulyadi 
because of  other reasons, namely, wider issues such as demoralization, 
acts of  polytheism, and infidelity. Dedi Mulyadi was accused of  turning 
the town to a Sunda Wiwitan or Hinduism area. Moreover, he was also 
blamed for preventing Purwakarta being a sharia town. Finally, he was 
indicted to denounce Islam as a foreign tradition coming from Saudi 
Arabia.33
Meanwhile, the AMS accused Habib Rizieq of  insulting Sundanese 
culture, and at the same time Dedi Mulyadi and the mayor of  Bandung 
for the period of  2013-2018, Ridwan Kamil demanded Habib Rizieq to 
apologize for his derogatory speech. Habib Rizieq responded the protest 
from the AMS and some segments of  Sundanese society by asserting 
that Sundanese must clearly think through his words. He explained that 
sampurasun is an honoured greeting and contains respect towards people. 
He further mentioned that sampurasun could be used as long as it did 
not replace assalamualaikum. He criticized Dedi Mulyadi for attempting 
to replace assalamualaikum with sampurasun.34 To this day, the dispute has 
reached no conclusion on the legal level because the authorities have not 
or may not take any action that is clear to both parties. Such a dispute 
that contains religious issues is certainly quite common in post-Suharto 
32 Oris Riswan, “Kronologi Plesetan Sampurasun hingga Pelaporan ke Polda 
Jabar”, Okezone.com, https://news.okezone.com/read/2015/11/26/525/1256154/
kronologi-plesetan-sampurasun-hingga-pelaporan-ke-polda-jabar, accessed 7 Jul 2016.
33 Oris Riswan, “Ini Isi Ceramah Habib Rizieq saat Plesetkan Sampurasun”, 
Okezone News, https://news.okezone.com/read/2015/11/27/525/1257151/ini-isi-
ceramah-habib-rizieq-saat-plesetkan-sampurasun?page=1., accessed 8 Jul 2016.
34 Caroline Damanik, “Diprotes karena Pelesetkan ‘Sampurasun’, 
Ini Respons Rizieq Syihab”, Kompas.com, http://megapolitan.kompas.com/
read/2015/11/26/08490071/Diprotes.karena.Pelesetkan.Sampurasun.Ini.Respons.
Rizieq.Syihab., accessed 7 Jul 2016.
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Indonesia. One of  the most notorious cases was the ‘Ahok blasphemy’ 
when the governor of  Jakarta for the period of  2014-2017, Basuki 
Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok was accused for alleged blasphemy over public 
comments that Ahok had made in September 2016 that allegedly insulted 
the Al-Maidah 51 verse of  the Quran.35
It seems that as a result of  the continual reformation process in the 
post-Suharto period, the interaction between Islam and local culture has 
entered a new stage of  relationship. As is the case in many developing 
societies, it seems quite obvious that the existence of  traditional local 
leaders, such as religious leaders, in a decentralized era cannot be ignored 
due to their constant influence. The circumstances in the West Java 
province encourage interaction between important segments of  society 
in which the ulama and the state officials form complex relationships in 
the struggle for influence; in which Islamic symbols, Islamic populism, 
popular Islamism, and patronage play significant parts. Moreover, despite 
different attitudes from the actors, their relationship is perhaps best 
described as pragmatic and mutually beneficial in nature. According 
to Hans Antlöv, the structure of  local politics created by the New 
Order administration was based on intimate personal relations and on 
patronage.36 In post-Suharto West Java, despite exceptions and changes, 
the circumstances have remained relatively similar.
The interaction between Islam and local culture in decentralized 
Indonesia has shaped and characterized identity politics of  certain 
groups and paved their way to involve in defining their own religion. 
Moreover, the interaction between the two sides needs to be seen in the 
context of  an increasingly fragmented Indonesia’s democracy movement. 
The implications of  this matter will serve as current understandings of  
decentralization, democratization, and emerging forms of  citizenship in 
Indonesia, particularly at local levels.
35 See for instance Charlotte Setijadi, “Chinese Indonesians in the Eyes of  the 
Pribumi Public”, ISEAS Perspective, no. 73 (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof  Ishak Institute, 
2017); Nursheila Muez, “Protesting Ahok: Flaking Indonesian Islam’s Pluralistic 
Tradition”, RSIS Commentary, no. CO16309 (Singapore: RSIS, 2016), https://www.rsis.
edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/CO16309.pdf, accessed 29 Sep 2018.
36 Hans Antlöv, “Not Enough Politics! Power, Participation and the New 
Democratic Polity in Indonesia”, in Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and 
Democratisation, ed. by Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), p. 196.
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Generally, the interaction between Islam and local culture in 
Indonesia can be considered as an arena of  contests, mainly between 
religious and cultural powers, in which the competing parties make 
extensive use of  Islamic symbols in interactions with the people. Despite 
the fact that this may seem a manipulative practice, the use of  Islamic 
symbols is actually considered necessary by the people, especially in 
West Java, as the Sundanese strongly identify with Islam. Therefore, I 
would maintain that in West Java, the ulama and state officials persistently 
strive for influence and have their own interests and their own means by 
which to maintain power, influence and social status, as we can see from 
the dispute in Purwakarta that involved religious leaders and regional 
heads. As I have revealed elsewhere, during the Suharto administration, 
collaboration between the ulama and the state apparatus appeared mainly 
in the socio-political realm. This minimized the political role of  the ulama. 
Since the collapse of  the Suharto administration, the ulama have been 
able to strengthen their visibility in the political constellation, and have 
come to possess important positions in various public domains. In this 
political sense, it is not uncommon for ulama to build alliances with the 
state officials in order to strengthen their power.37 
The relationships between religious leaders and state officials in 
West Java have been complex. The struggle for influence within these 
elites is not only centred on opportunities for private material benefits, 
but also on political competition which is loosely organized, pragmatic, 
and often mutually beneficial in nature. Their continuous presence in the 
post-Suharto period reflects their constant influence over society, and 
their presence actually fits well within on-going state-building processes. 
The presence of  local leaders is highly apparent in their struggle for 
influence, in connecting the local community with the outside world, 
and in defining the appropriate values and norms for the citizens. In 
the struggle for influence, Islamic symbols, wealth, and genealogy are 
extensively used to win the supports of  the citizens, while patronage 
and personal relations become the prevalent pattern in relationships 
with the citizens. 
In sum, the relationships between Islam and local politics in 
West Java should be understood as an aspect of  centralization during 
37 Pribadi, “Islam and Politics in Madura”, pp. 296–7.
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the New Order and decentralization during the post-New Order. The 
transformation from one administration to another in West Java, however, 
should not be understood as an automatic shift from an authoritarian 
rule to a democratic one. The processes have been marked by many 
undemocratic changes, continuities, repetitions, and developments in 
Sundanese society.
The encounter between Habib Rizieq and Dedi Mulyadi is one 
of  a few examples in the post-New Order that a struggle for influence 
between Islam and local culture is still a sensitive and key issue in 
Indonesia, including in West Java and Purwakarta. The case also shows 
how undemocratic changes and continuities are still prevalent in everyday 
life of  democratizing Indonesia. It indicates that the creation of  a 
strong and autonomous civil society is still hampered by the presence 
of  an ineffective state system. The dispute also shows that identity 
politics is one of  the key elements in the process of  democratization 
in Indonesia. However, it also shows that the struggle could well be a 
counter-productive development in democratization and ongoing state 
building processes in Indonesia.  
E. Individual Goals in the Name of  Empowerment
Ethnic and religious struggles have been a clear sign of  how 
Indonesia was strongly influenced by an authoritarian regime under 
Suharto. According to Harold Crouch, authoritarian regimes exercise 
substantial control over society. In addition, there is another significant 
way in which authoritarian regimes dominate society; that is to say, the 
development of  political methods to maintain control. Despite the 
regimes’ claims that the political institutions of  authoritarian regimes 
permit the people to participate in the decision-making process, such 
pseudo-democratic characteristics typically administer the people in 
well-designed ways that reinforce the regimes.38 As I have shown in this 
paper, what is obviously striking is that the fact that ethnic and religious 
struggles have been inherited from the New Order and have become one 
of  the most essential features of  the post-New Order politics. The roles 
38 Harold Crouch, “Introduction”, in State and Civil Society in Indonesia, ed. by Arief  
Budiman (Clayton, Victoria: Centre of  Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 
1990), pp. 115–6.
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of  local-level leaders in maintaining these struggles in order to reach their 
political goals have put a question whether decentralization have really 
led the country to democracy or to guide back to the previous regime.
Dedi Mulyadi’s political aspirations in the post-Suharto period seem 
to indicate the pragmatism of  state officials as power brokers. When 
beneficial opportunities knock, they do not waste them, although they 
do risk their respected position in society. Their pragmatism also shows 
the ability of  state officials as individuals who are capable of  placing 
themselves in the public eye. They tend to seek secure places within 
communities in order not to become trapped in the wrong political 
choice, so that when there is a political change (as was the case after the 
Suharto administration collapsed), they know how to voice their political 
aspirations or they know how the people will voice theirs. The use of  
socio-cultural elements by state officials is in fact frequently directed at 
protecting their privileged economic and political capitals. 
Dedi Mulyadi’s ideas about Sundanese culture have been shaped 
and characterized by concerns over what its fate will be, and what 
opportunities may lie ahead in the era of  regional autonomy. His 
opponents also see their opportunities to use culture and religion to their 
advantage, although they frequently struggle against increasing grievances 
from the population who do not see Sundanese culture in a similar way 
to the people’s leaders of  other West Javanese cities. Meanwhile, local 
people are struggling to reinvent their lives and to accommodate a cultural 
and social existence that they have lived with through various periods 
of  external domination and control. In Purwakarta, Dedi Mulyadi’s 
dream to create a true Sundanese society has been hampered by mostly 
‘religious’ obstacles. Here we are witnessing how his struggle goes on, 
and it appears to be a touchstone of  the regional autonomy laws to see 
whether or not the community can discover a real autonomy that they 
are really looking for.
All the above examples seem to indicate that Dedi Mulyadi is 
a pragmatic individual. However, I would suggest that his supposed 
pragmatic attitudes would not last very long if  they were not sustained 
by a strong sense of  identity. Dedi Mulyadi has been pushing his 
counter-culture vis-à-vis the ‘Islamic culture’, which is very influential 
in Sundanese society, even at the lowest level. Nevertheless, as indicated 
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in the dispute against Habib Rizieq, Kiai Muhammad Syahid Joban, 
and other Islamic organizations, he would opt not to openly attack or 
denounce the ‘Islamic culture’ since its main supporters, religious mass-
based leaders, are highly regarded by some segments of  society, including 
by Purwakarta residents. 
Although this sounds very pragmatic to outsiders, many citizens 
are never really bothered by the fact that many state officials have dual 
status. If  we look at the situation during the New Order in which some 
West Java parliament members from the PPP were kiai, perhaps we may 
understand why having a dual status is not such a crucial issue. In fact, 
many people expected that these kiai-politicians would be able to better 
voice their concerns. Nevertheless, there has been a slight trend in the 
post-Suharto period for kiai who become politicians to be somewhat 
distrusted by the people when it comes to their pragmatism and political 
manoeuvring. This also holds true for ‘culture man’ cum politicians, such 
as Dedi Mulyadi. 
Through promoting Sundanese culture as the ultimate identity, 
Dedi Mulyadi has arguably won the heart of  many Sundanese anywhere 
in identifying their socio-cultural identity, particularly those who reject 
Islamization of  politics disseminated by Islamist leaders, such as Habib 
Rizieq. His influence has widely spread beyond Purwakarta, not only to 
other places in West Java, but also to other places in Indonesia where 
revivalism of  local culture is seen as a sign of  people’s representation.39 
This could happen, and is in line with Erb, Beni & Anggal’s argument, 
because decentralization has encouraged people to transform the 
New Order emphasis on ‘national culture’ and ‘national building, 
through various draconian means to create citizens out of  the disparate 
populations of  Indonesia to a redefining of  culture from the point of  
view of  the regions. This transformation appears to be a process by 
which local communities are empowered to rethink and re-imagine what 
39 See for instance, Dedi Mulyadi Siap Bangun Kampung Sunda di Lombok 
Nusa Tenggara Barat - Tribun Jabar, http://jabar.tribunnews.com/2018/08/30/dedi-
mulyadi-siap-bangun-kampung-sunda-di-lombok-nusa-tenggara-barat, accessed 29 Sep 
2018; M. Ali Khumaini, “Dedi Mulyadi menggagas ‘Sunda Jazz Festival Internasional’”, 
antaranews.com, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/703560/dedi-mulyadi-menggagas-
sunda-jazz-festival-internasional, accessed 29 Sep 2018.
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culture and community means to them.40 However, an essential question 
arises, is this a sort of  socio-cultural empowerment promoted by the 
regent for the citizens?
To understand the situation, we must be aware of  the importance 
of  charisma, which is still prevalent in the post-Suharto period. Even 
though various local groups at the regency and provincial levels, such 
as NGOs, students’ associations, and workers’ unions, have sometimes 
taken matters into their own hands when it comes to land occupations, 
human rights, and corruption, ordinary people at the regency level have 
rarely experienced such a post-Suharto ‘euphoria’ from participation, 
and have reaped little rewards from being given more access to local 
governments. Their public participation is still limited to the regency 
level. Therefore, any people’s leader who is able to win the support of  
the citizens, especially who possesses charisma, is likely to gain the most 
followers. That is actually what has been happening with Dedi Mulyadi. 
Dedi Mulyadi’s strategies of  strengthening cultural identities 
to adapt to decentralization and democratization features of  post-
authoritarian Indonesia are key to maintaining his respected position and 
charisma in society and expanding his influence outside his territory. The 
ongoing processes of  decentralization and democratization have indeed 
provided local leaders with a large space to create political manoeuvres 
that are mostly hidden in rethorics. Dedi Mulyadi has successfully played 
his roles as the guardian and supporter of  ‘real’ Sundanese culture in 
the emerging Islamist culture. Therefore, Dedi Mulyadi has directly and 
indirectly employed strategies that affect his individual goals, his identity, 
his representation of  his people, and his socio-cultural empowerment 
he has promoted. In turn, his strategies have significantly shaped and 
characterized the development and dynamics of  Indonesia’s fledgling 
democracy.
F. Concluding Remarks
Democratization and decentralization have been understood by 
40 Maribeth Erb, Romanus Beni, and Wilhelmus Yustinus Anggal, “Creating 
Cultural Identity in an Era of  Regional Autonomy: Reinventing Manggarai?”, in 
Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia, ed. by Maribeth Erb, Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, and 
Carole Faucher (London; New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), pp. 149–50.
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many local leaders as tools to initiate local empowerment as well as to 
maintain patronage. Local leaders have responded in various ways to 
ideological and political developments, in part because in each area they 
relate to localized political situations. In present day Indonesia, religious 
life has not been integrated into the political state. However, it is clear 
that religious life has greatly increased and has become a way of  life of  
many citizens. This situation has forced the supporters of  ‘cultural’ life 
to extensively interact with increasing religious life in which notions of  
Islamic symbols and cultural pride been used in order to convey messages 
in the encounters between Islam and local culture. 
Dedi Mulyadi has involved in the turbulent political arenas, and has 
helped shape the contours of  the political situation beyond his territory. 
He employed socio-cultural-based policies to develop his regency, and 
faced various encounters with Islamization of  politics hindering his 
strategies to reach his individual goals, to present his identity, to represent 
his people as well as to empower cultural resilience. The regent appeared 
to have empowered cultural resilience in the midst of  Islamization of  
politics across Indonesia. Dedi Mulyadi has been a key driver in a local 
level who played pivotal roles in his way of  defining ethnic hegemony, 
creating authority and empowering cultural resilience. It is quite obvious 
that the ongoing state-building processes, including decentralization 
and democratization, have provided local leaders with a large space to 
create political manoeuvres, and have allowed for the emergence of  new 
seemingly-autonomous local leaders, such as Dedi Mulyadi. However, 
these political circumstances and struggles are obviously an arena of  
the elites, not a field of  the citizens who often play their part only as 
spectators. In turn, the creation of  a strong civil society is obviously still 
hampered by the presence of  an ineffective state system, and that it is 
worried that Indonesia may still not experience thorough democratic 
consolidation in the near future.
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